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Abstract or
THE HISTORIC END O.b' CLOSED SEAS
The regime of closed seas has developed over the years
until the Soviet Union is the only nation that speaks of
them as a separate regime in their present international law
textbooks. The Soviet Union has claimed the Black, Baltic,
Caspian, White, Kara, Laptev, Bering, East Siberian,
Chukotsk, Sea of Azov, Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan
as closed seas. Since the ANGLO-NORWEGIAN case of 1951 it
appears that the drawing of baselines and claims to large
water areas based on historic use has a basis under inter-
national law. It appears that areas which were claimed as
closed seas are now becoming historic waters.
The United States has for years been the strong sup-
porter of freedom of the seas. They have tried to limit all
claims to territorial waters, but have now expressed a de-
sire to extend their territorial limits to 12 miles. In 1960
this may have been good for some form of compromise, but is
now the limit of most of the nations of the world and thus
~ractically customary international law. It is past time
for the United States to consider what is happening in the
Arctic area and to realize that they can easily be told not
to use the Northeast or the Northwest passages. It may be
that they have conceded the Northeast passage to the Soviet
Union by acquiescence now.
ii
PREFACE
Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to consider the
rather vague claims to closed seas by the Soviet Union and
to determine what direction these claims are taking. The
first part of the paper deals with the history and develop-
ment of the closed sea concept and expands it into the
present day claims in this area. It attempts to show how
some of the past claims have remained over the years and how
some of the others have progressed to claims of historic
waters. In the final section an attempt is made to show
some method for resolving some of the problems that have
been shown by projecting a regime which might be used to
satisfy both the Soviet Union and the United States for
future control of these seas and like seas of other nations.
Sources. Most of the sources used in this paper were
of an international law nature. The topic under which most
of them were cataloged was "Maritime Law" or "Freedom of the
Seas." Under maritime law most of the information was under
delimitation of inland waters, territorial waters, and high
seas. The remainder is listed under rrhistoric" bays. It
was only in Soviet law textbooks that closed seas were
listed as separate regimes of the sea.
Comparisons. There are a number of distances and areas
given for comparison. On occasions dimensions of unrelated,
iii
better known areas, are listed to provide for ease of com-
parison. The reason for this is that some of the areas
listed are not generally well known and have been called by
various names over the years. A sea twice the size of Texas
may draw more attention than one which is only 550,000 square
miles. The physical size of the problem is more significant
at present than is the economic impact. Population and tech-
nology will soon overtake this difference.
War and Peace. International law of the sea is gen-
erally divided between the law during time of peace and that
during time of war. For the purpose of this paper it is
important to realize that only the law during time of peace
is considered. The laws of war will hopefully not be needed
to deal with this problem.
iv
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THE HISTORIC END OF CLOSED SEAS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the years the Soviet Union has been seeking
a warm water entrance to the sea. This has led to some very
interesting construction projects and to the expansion of
the nation to desolate areas in hopes of finding some
method for using the sea. At every turn they have found
themselves blocked at one point or another by the geographic
considerations of the water areas that bound that great na-
tion. They became a Black Sea power in the 18th century and
soon found themselves limited in exit through the straits
that control this sea. When they became a Baltic power,
they again found that control of the straits was most im-
portant for controlling the use of this sea. In the Pacific
area they were limited by the narrow straits from the Sea of
Japan and a very powerful Japanese Navy that was not going
to allow the Russian fleet free use of the sea in their back
yard. Their only apparent wish for control of the sea was
to insure that they were allowed full use both for their
merchant and warships. In addition, they wished to control
the flow of nonlittoral warships to and from the area. This
was apparently not an attempt to control the economics of the
sea, but rather, to provide for the security of her own
forces.
1
Now the Soviet Union has ~hown that they not only dc-
n Lr-e to c on tt-o I t.he sea, lHIL t.ha t. Lhcy have t.he t.ec.hnol.ogy
to produce the ships both merchant and war. Along with the
demonstrated technology is a long-range building program
for merchant, fishing and warships. The rapid growth of
their fishing fleet has been the talk of the past decade in
the sea.
The Soviet Union is the largest nation in the world.
Most of their coast is covered for long periods each year
with ice. For this reason the Soviet Union is generally not
considered to have much coastal territory; however, they
presently have the largest amount of coast of any nation in
the world with a total of 23,098 miles. l This makes Indonesia
second with 19,889 miles, followed by Australia (15,091
miles), the United States (11,650 miles) and Canada (11,129
miles).2 When looking at the vast coastal area it becomes
apparent that the Soviet Union indeed controls a considerable
amount of territorial water based upon their 12 mile limit.
There is much more to this limit than meets the eye. The
outer limit of internal waters must be determined before
territorial waters are established.
There are 14 seas that border the Soviet Union, and of
these, they consider five of them to be closed seas, six to
be historic waters, two as high seas, and one to be an in-
ternal lake.3 It is not difficult to understand what is
2
meant by high seas and an internal lake as these are defined
in Oppenheim's and Colombos' books on international law of
4the sea. The subject of closed seas and historic waters
are not as well defined and are not even considered by many
to have any basis in international law. It is these two
areas that will be explored and defined. The original in-
tent was to discuss only the area of closed seas, but as the
study progressed, the two tended to overlap and even in some
cases, there were periods where claims to areas were both as
closed seas and historic waters. 5
Based on the figure of 23,000 miles of coastline, it
can be estimated that the Soviet Union has about 276,000
square miles of territorial seas. This is a considerable
amount of territory when it is pointed out that it is much
larger than the North Sea. There is approximately one and
one-half million square miles of sea that is claimed as
closed seas, while approximately one million square miles
is claimed on a historic basis. The claims to closed seas
as well as some of those to historic waters are unofficial
in nature. They are written into the international law text-
books and not set down in official unilateral proclamations.
Such unilateral proclamations tend to cause official pro-
tests, as was the case when the Soviet Union made official
6its historic claim to Peter the Great Bay. These protests
in turn could terminate the historic significance that has
been generated over the years.
3
The area which presently falls under the category of
territorial seas is approximately nine times smaller than
is the area which is claimed as closed seas or historic
waters. The 12 mile claim to territorial seas has only
been official since 1927.7 It was not until 26 May 1950
that the Soviet Union acknowledged that their territorial
claims of 12 miles in the Baltic area were a result of the
81927 statute on state boundaries. This claim of a 12 mile
territorial limit has created much controversy, and the
United States and its allies have not been willing to accept
it as legal under international law. The claim has been ob-
served and allowed to gain historic and customary value
under international law. Very few protests have been made
to their unofficial claims to historic waters, but they
also have been observed and allowed to generate great his-
toric value.
Looking to the textbooks of the U.S.S.R., it is ap-
parent that many of the Russian jurists have for a long
period of time claimed the following as closed seas: BLACK
SEA, BALTIC SEA, CASPIAN SEA, SEA OF JAPAN, and the SEA OF
OKHOTSK. 9 The Bering Sea is now claimed as high sea, but
there has been a time when there was a claim of at least
100 miles in this area. This was settled about 1825. 10
The KARA, LAPTEV, EAST SIBERIAN and CHUKOTSK seas are his-
toric waters and are gaining a great deal of historic value
each year. l l The Barents sea is declared to be high sea,
4
and the reason may be to prevent others from claiming it.
The U.S.S.R. may be somewhat concerned that the Norwegian
claim to a sector of the Arctic is much more valid than is
their historic or sector claim in that area, and thus,
wants to make sure that this area remains open. 12 The
U.S.S.R. has never really claimed the Arctic, but they do
have a rather vague sector claim to the land to the north,
both discovered and undiscovered. 13 The word vague is used
. due to the possibility that they may intend to use the
stationary ice definition as being the same as land. How-
ever, many explorers over the years, including Russian,
14have shown the polar ice to be far from stationary. The
Sea of Azov is a bay of the Black Sea and is internal waters
of the U.S.S.R., in the classic sense. There seem to be no
claims to the area, but it is controlled by the U.S.S.R. and
this control is undisputed. The Gulf of Riga, Cheshskaya
Bay, the White Sea and Peter the Great Bay are other areas
which have official claims to them. 15
This takes us all the way around the largest nation in
the world with the largest amount of coastline. A good
percentage is not considered in theory or in practice to be
high seas.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the closed seas
and historic ~aters of the Soviet Union and attempt to de-
termine how valid these claims are and what an acceptable
regime for these areas might be.
5
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY
Freedom of the seas did not become a problem for men
until the 15th century. It was at this time that the long
sea voyages started. Pope Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia)
divided the undiscovered world between Spain and Portugal
by a line drawn from pole to pole one hundred leagues west
of the Azores. One year later, in 1494, the nations con-
cerned agreed to shift the line to 379 leagues west of the
Cape Verde Islands. This line was to prevent all commerce
1in the ocean except by license of the sovereigns concerned.
These claims seemed to pass without comment until Queen
Elizabeth I replied to a 1580 Spanish protest of Drake's
voyage in the Golden Hind. In her reply the Queen declared
that the use of the sea and the air was free to all mankind
and that no exclusive rights could be claimed. 2 The Dutch
were soon to support this English point of view, but the
English only supported the view themselves when it was in
their national interest. From about the 13th century onward,
even as late as 1851, the English claimed sovereignty over
the North Sea and the waters adjacent to the British Isles. 3
These claims generally took the form of demanding salutes
from foreign ships in these waters.
8
The Dutch protested to the Portuguese for limi~ing
their free trade in the East Indian Seas at the star~ cf ~he
17th century. Hugo Grotius wrote an essay on this subject
entitled Mare Liberum (Free Seas), which was published in
1609. 4 This essay was written in legal form with great
force and put forward one of the first great steps of the
international law of the sea. John Selden followed this
essay with his writing entitled Mare Clausum (Closed Seas).
Selden had the upper hand in that he could counter each
point that Grotius made without fear of committing himself
to original thoughts. This was published by King Charles I
of England who wished to justify the English claims to
their adjacent waters. 5
In his essay Grotius made the following basic points:
waters of the ocean are not susceptible to effective occupa-
tion, and the sea cannot be exhausted either by navigation
or by fiShing. 6 Grotius did concede a possible claim to a
marginal belt. Selden countered these arguments with the
thought that the ocean was an area over which there was
jurisdiction without dominion. 7 Selden did concede the
right of free navigation subject to limited restrictions.
Grotius had intended ,to provide free trade for his country
while Selden was interested in security.
other writers seemed to express themselves more clearly,
if less artistically, by rattling the guns of a strong navy.
9
The strength of this navy had been developed to protect
their foreign interests and their merchant fleet at sea. It
seemed unfair that other nations should be allotted equal
claim to the seas without the expense of a naval force. In
the 13th century the Danes had considered it only fair to
charge "sound dues" for the passage of ships into the Baltic.
These charges were for services rendered in providing naviga-
tion facilities, clearing the area of pirates, and keeping
the channel well marked and clear of obstacles. The United
states protested these charges in 1844. The Copenhagen
Conference was held in 1857. At this conference several
nations agreed to pay a lump sum settlement to Denmark if
they agreed to discontinue the "sound dues." A three million
pound settlement was agreed upon for which England paid
8
over half. The United states paid nothing since they claimed
that they did not recognize the Danes' right to charge these
fees. Settlement was made however the following year.
The Soviet Union made claim to the Bering Sea as a
Mare Clausum in 1821. 9 This claim was to establish a 100
mile area adjacent to the coast of the Soviet Union for the
purpose of providing fishing zones. The United States and
England protested loudly. This Claim was resolved in 1825 in
an agreement with England over the boundary between Alaska
and Canada. In 1886 the United States made another claim
to the Bering Sea as a Mare Clausum. 10 This claim was made
by Secretary of State Blaine in an effort to protect the
10
seals. A United states warship apprehended three Canadian
seal vessels 70-100 miles off the Pribilof Islands. The
case was not settled until 1893 at the Paris International
Tribunal of Arbitration. The United states lost the case
handily. The court continued the case because they felt
obligated to protect the seals from extinction. This
proved that the court knew a great deal more about law than
it did about seals, and it was not until 1911 that the
problem of the seals was satisfactorily resolved.
There has only been one recent case where a claim has
been made to Mare Clausum. The Gulf of Aqaba was claimed by
the government of Saudi Arabia in 1949, and they stated at
this time that it was subject to the provision of interna-
tional law as to the innocent passage of vessels of other
nations through the coastal sea. Egypt and Saudi Arabia
declared themselves belligerents and then proceeded to
11blockade the area from all the traffic to the port of Elath.
There existed at this time an armistice, which according to
the U.N. precluded blockade action. The U.N. further de-
clared the area an international waterway and placed troops
to insure that it was kept open.
It is with this beginning that we see various regimes
of the Law of the Sea unfolded. Internal waters, terri-
torial waters, and high seas have had their boundaries moved
around in the same liquid fashion as the sea itself. A
11
famous Dutch jurist, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, whose fame
was second only to Grotius, published this statement in 1702:
Accordingly, I should think that possession
of an adjacent sea should be extended to that place
up to which it can be considered as sUbject to the
mainlandj indeed, only to that point is it justly
defined, even though it be not navigated upon con-
tinually and to that point, is possession sought
by law, guarded; for there can be no question that
one possesses continually who so possesses a thing
that another is unable to possess it against his
will. Wherefore, we do not concede dominion of an
adjacent sea further than that distance from the
land where it can be ruled. 12
This is what may have led to the territorial limit of
three miles for this was the range of the cannon of the day.
But this statement contained no such hard and fast rule, nor
did the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
of 1958. The problem of the extent of territorial waters
is still unresolved today. The problem is one of satisfying
the national interests of all the nations of the world with
one written statement. This statement must cover the geo-
graphic, historic and economics considerations of the
world.
The history of Soviet claims to ocean areas is vague
and has developed more since the end of World War II than
in the time before. Prior to this time they were more in-
volved in an internal struggle and the development of in-
ternal waterways was most important.
The strategic importance of the inland water-
ways became particularly evident during the reign
of Peter the Great, who could not have held the
12
newly-gained positions on the Baltic nor have ex-
erted pressure on the Black Sea Turks without an
increasingly large-scale use of inland waterways
for transporting men and materials and for the
movemept of warships. It is no exaggeration to
say that development of inland navigation in Russia,
both economically and strategically played a role
in the rise of the empire similar to that which the
mastery of the open seas played in the case of the
great maritime nations. 13
These internal waterways have connected most of the
western seas that border the Soviet Union. These are the
closed seas and the historic waters about which so little
is said. The northeastern passage to the north of the
U.S.S.R. may soon be a major water route. With the dis-
covery of oil on the north edge of Alaska, our national
interests may find that we are indeed concerned about this
area that has been so long neglected.
13
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DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSION
Section 1
Definitions
Mare Clausum and the present day closed sea are not the
same. Mare Clausum was originally intended to close off
large portions of the ocean for economic and security pur-
poses without regard to geography and with disregard for the
needs of other states. This regime has faded over the years
and no longer exists. The closest thing now to this regime
is the possible future of Conservation Zones.
The present day closed sea as it is defined in the
Soviet Union is as follows:
1. A closed sea is a body of water with two
or more states littoral to it.
2. There are very few narrow entrances to
this body of water.
3. The body of water has limited security or
economic interests to nations other than those
littoral.
4. There is an absence of international mari-
time routes through this body of water. l
In Soviet diplomatic and contra~t~al practice, closed
seas are designated as seas for which a special regime is
established, either for historical reasons or by virtue of
international agreements, providing for closure of these
15
seas or the establishment of a restricted regime of naviga-
tion for warships and military aircraft of noncoastal states.
Closed seas are generally open to the innocent passage of
merchant shipping of all the nations of the world. The water
area of some closed seas is subject to the internal regime
of one of the coastal states while others have a territorial
belt and the waters beyond that limit are open for the
general use of all coastal states on an equal basis. 2
Historic waters are generally not defined by anyone;
however, they have evolved from the definitions of "historic"
bays. There has been a trend in Soviet international law
from historic bays to historic seas to historic waters. The
latter of these is presently most used by Soviet jurists. 3
The following is the definition to be used for historic
waters:
1. A state exercises actual control over a
specified water area.
2. This control has been exercised for a long
period of time.
3. 4 Other nations have acquiesced in theseclaims.
In Soviet Law the regime of inland sea waters extends
to historic waters, particularly the so-called "historic
bays." An "historic bay" is a bay completely surrounded
by the territory of a single state, with an entrance ex-
ceeding 24 miles in width, which, due to special geographic
conditions and military significance, as well as historic
16
tradition, based on continuous control over its waters by
the coastal state, is regarded by the latter as its own in-
land sea waters. 5 They specifically state, "From the stand-
point of international law, the recognition by other states
of one bay or another as an 'historic bay' belonging to the
coastal state is not of decisive significance.,,6
It is interesting to note the change of what various
seas have been referred to in the past. In 1893, Russia
claimed the White Sea as a closed sea and in 1956, the naval
international law manual referred to it as an historic bay.
In a 1951 international law textbook, The Kara, Laptev, East
Siberian, and Chokotsk Seas were referred to as "closed seas
of the bay type." In 1966 came reference to these very same
sea areas as "historic waters."7
Section 2
Law of the Sea
The International Law Commission (ILC) had its first
session in 1949- This commission had before it a memorandum
from the Secretary-General of the U.N. in which he asked
them to make a comprehensive study of the international law
of the sea for the purpose of codifying the entire field into
an integrated restatement. The Secretary-General must have
remembered the Hague codification Conference of 1930 which
ended in disagreement over the limit of the territorial waters
17
l'
l. 'ILC completed their report ill l~):)u. 'I'he r-c por-i r-cc ommcu.tcd
that an international conference or government representa-
tives should be established to examine the law of the sea.
This was approved by the General Assembly and from 24 Febru-
ary to 27 April 1958, 86 states sat down together to discuss
the matter. The conference adopted four important conven-
tions which were in general based on the report of the ILC.
Two of these conventions are of interest with regard to his-
toric waters and closed seas. These are the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Convention
on the High Seas. The Convention on the High Seas is only
of interest in that this is the convention that suffers under
the claim of closed seas and historic waters. The last part
of Article 2 which states: "The s e freedoms, and others which
are recognized by the general principles of international
law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard
to the interests of other States in the exercise of the
freedom of the high seas. rr 9 The Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone is the one which most nearly
describes the problem of historic waters. Article 7 dis-
cusses the law of bays in general. It describes bays and
the method for delimiting the bays with a closing line not
to exceed 24 miles. Article 7, paragraph 6, goes on to say:
6. The foregoin~
called "historic
straight baseline
is applied. 10
provisions shall not apply to so-
bays, or in any case where that
system provided for in article 4
18
The ~onvention thu~ nllow8 states to enclose bays with
Q ;~}I· mile b,L',elilH; or: wi t.h a lunge]' blwelillG if it i:3 un
"historic" bay. A resolution was adopted to study the "his-
toric" bay concept and determine what was meant by the term.
This was accomplished by the office of the Secretariat in
1962. The report was entitled "Juridical Regime of Historic
Waters Including Historic Bays." It was determined in this
report that claims to historic waters should be handled on
a case by case basis. l l Closed seas do not appear in the
Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The
Soviet Union attempted to include this subject in the con-
vention but "t.he United States and its military allies in
effect torpedoed discussion of the special status of closed
12
seas." There are a number of problems with the Convention
on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, a few of which
were: the right of innocent passage, passage through in-
ternational straits, breadth of the territorial sea, and
resolution of "historic ll bays. Max Sorensen outlined the
major drawbacks of the 1958 Geneva Convention, the first
of which was:
The first drawback is essentially the product
of political factors. The material interests in-
volved, whether of national economy or military
security, are so considerable that governments
hesitate to make concessions for the sole purpose
of reaching a solution. From the national point
of view, uncertainty on a point of international
law is often preferable to a certainty that leaves
no room for unilateral action or maneuvering. 13
19
It is this point of view that makes some of the weak-
nesses of the conventions more understandable and acceptable.
The right of innocent passage, passage through international
straits and resolution of "historic" bays are the primary
problems to be resolved with regard to the future of historic
waters and closed seas.
A misunderstanding of closed seas and historic waters
between the United States and the Soviet Union may lead to
serious problems in the future. The initial interpretation
that one may gleen from these conventions can be very con-
fusing. Innocent passage of warships seems implied by omis-
sion, but this is hardly the case if the proceedings are
used for interpretation. 14 The Soviet Union in an effort to
make sure that no such mistake was made, has made reserva-
tion to this and has continued to revise their local regu-
lations concerning visits of warships so that it is very
clear that they will not tolerate such passage into their
territorial waters. At the same time that this is taking
place, they continue to transit within the United States'
territorial waters even though these claims are only one-
fourth those of the Soviets. 15
At the end of the 1958 Geneva Convention, the U.S.S.R.
made the following reservations to the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone:
20
To Article 20: The Government of the U.S.S.R.
considers that state vessels in foreign terri-
torial waters enjoy immunity, and therefore the
application of measures mentioned in the present
articles to them may occur with the consent of
the state under whose flag the ship sails.
To Article 23: (Subsection D. The Rules as ap-
plied to warships) The Government of the U.S.S.R.
considers that a coastal state has the right to
establish an authorization procedure for the passage 6of foreign warships through its territorial waters. l
With the convention completed and these reservations
made, it then appears that the Soviet Union decided to re-
view their local regulations and laws to insure that they
could protect their national interests satisfactorily and
that the laws complied with the new conventions. Several
of their laws were rewritten prior to the Convention coming
into effect. The following legislation appears to be a
result of the Geneva Convention based on its date and con-
tent: Statute on Protection of U.S.S.R. State Boundary
(1960) and Rules for Visit by Foreign Warships to U.S.S.R.
Waters (1960). The statute for protection of the state
boundary is a rewrite of a 1927 law which more clearly states
territorial boundaries especially with respect to terri-
torial waters. Articles 3 and 4 of this statute are quoted
in part as follows:
Article 3. Coastal sea waters, 12 nautical miles
in breadth, computed from the line of lowest ebb
tide both on the mainland and also around islands,
or from the line of the farthest extremity of in-
ternal sea waters of the U.S.S.R. shall constitute
the territorial waters of the U.S.S.R. In ...
21
Article 4. Internal sea waters of the U.S.S.R.
shall include: a) waters of parts of the U.S.S.R.,
delimited seaward by lines passing through the
farthest extending points of hydrotechnical or
other structures of ports seaward; b) waters of
bays, inlets, coves, and estuaries, whose entire
shore belongs to the U.S.S.R., up to a straight
line drawn from shore to shore in a place where,
seaward, one or several passages are first formed4if the breadth of each of these does rot exceed 2
nautical miles; c) waters of bays, inlets, coves,
and estuaries, seas and straits, historically be-
longing to the U.S.S.R.17
These articles are obviously intended to conform to
some degree with the new convention, but with regard to
historic waters, it could readily encompass almost anything.
The rules for visits by foreign warships to territorial
waters sets up a system by which consent must be sought at
least thirty days in advance of the intended visit. In-
formation concerning the purpose of the visit, port of call,
number, class, name, basic measurements, duration of stay,
rank and name of the Commanding Officer must be provided.
The number of ships may not exceed three, and they may not
stay longer than seven days. The instructions and procedures
as to what the ship and its crew may and may not do is
18
rigorous. This reasonably well confirms that warships
will not make innocent passage through Soviet waters.
Section 3
Rivers, Straits and Canals
The regime for straits, canals and rivers is important
for understanding some of the problems of closed seas. The
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new construction of the Volga-Don canal constitutes a
notable attempt by the U.S.S.R. to rectify the Black Sea's
isolation from the internal Russian river and canal systems,
which linked the Baltic, Caspian and the Arctic Ocean. Con-
siderable progress can also be recorded in the construction
of the main bed of the Kara Kum Canal in Soviet Turkmenia,
which was completed in 1962. A planned 300 mile extension
will enable ships to pass from the Baltic by way of existing
waterways to the Caspian and through the Soviet Central Asian
Republics to Afghanistan and would thus provide one of the
cheapest means of communications between Europe and Asia. 19
The use of canals is even important for areas where at first
glance they may seem unneeded. The Kiel Canal is an easy
exit from the Baltic even though there are straits usable
for the purpose. On the other hand, look at the results of
closing the Suez Canal upon the respective importance of the
Gulf of Aqaba.
The regime for straits and canals have a very prominent
effect on closed seas. At the beginning of this study it
became apparent that the regime for straits was the only real
and viable regime for closed seas. The regime to which I
am referring is the Montreux Convention which controls the
entry into the Black Sea. The Geneva Convention of 1958
discusses the regime for straits and the outcome is far
from satisfying in that the wording of the text of the
23
Convention is obviously intended to be vague to prevent
further problems in the acceptance of the Convention as a
whole. There was discussion concerning a regime for straits
between two high seas and then discussion of a regime for
straits between high seas and territorial waters. In the
final draft of the Convention, these are lumped together and
subject to considerable interpretation. Straits have been
the most controversial item concerning the control of closed
seas over the years. Canals have not caused a great deal of
historic international problems over the years since it is
only recently that technology has existed that would permit
ocean vessels to use canals. By recently 50 to 100 years is
implied. Rivers and associated canal systems have had great
effect on the use of the Arctic areas of the Soviet Union.
By use of the inland water system of the Soviet Union, the
Baltic, Caspian, Black and the White Seas are connected.
This system is only usable for about 240 days a year due to
20ice. This is the result of a very large investment of
labor and money to provide transportation that is taken for
granted by the major sea powers of the world. This water
system is a very complicated system that has been years in
the making. Parts of it have been started by one government
and then discontinued only to be restarted by another. Most
of these waterways were originally designed for ships with a
21draft not to exceed 15 feet. This depth will accommodate
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most barge traffic, but will only handle limited ocean and
warship traffic. Needless to say, this has caused many en-
gineering innovations for the inland shipbuilding facilities
providing new construction techniques. It is through these
waterways that the Soviet Union has developed.
Section 4
Soviet Investment in the Sea
The Soviet Union has placed a great deal of interest
and investment toward improving its position in the sea. It
will be necessary to briefly explore this investment to de-
termine why they might be more interested in the sea and what
direction they might take toward resolution of historic water
and closed sea problems. By looking briefly at their naval
forces, merchant fleet, fishing fleet, oceanography efforts
and maritime aid we might see a trend.
In some categories of sea power, the Soviet Union has
already surpassed the United States. In others, they are
catching up. The Soviet Union presently has many more con-
ventionally powered submarines, cruise-missile systems on
surface ships and on submarines, and a missile-equipped
fleet of patrol boats. They are gaining in POLARIS-type
ballistic-missiles submarines. The Soviet Navy lags in
logistic support for sustained combat operations. It is
inferior in antisubmarine warfare capabilities, in the
25
capacity for long-range amphibious operations, and ship-
based naval air power. Major efforts are underway to over-
come most of these weakhesses.
The Soviet Union now can deploy modern naval forces
where there had previously been no significant Soviet naval
presence. Today, the Soviet Navy in conjunction With Soviet
land-based air power, poses a significant political threat
in the Mediterranean Sea and a minor, but increasing mili-
tary threat to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The Soviet Union has
the means to send amphibious forces of modest size to more
distant waters. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy is
establishing a presence where there is no western counter-
part, save for our small Mid-East Force in the Persian Gulf.
The large Soviet submarine fleet already could present a
critical threat to shipping on the major sea lanes.
In its approach to naval problems, the SOViet Union
has often demonstrated remarkable technical skill, notably
in missile and electronic systems. If present trends con-
tinue, within a decade the Soviet Union, as compared to the
United States, will have as many or more nuclear-powered
submarines, larger ballistic-missile-carrying submarine
forces, new helicopter carriers and more modern cruisers,
destroyers and frigates. This would provide the means to
project diverse types of naval power around the globe. Even
the long-standing invulnerability of our POLARIS submarines
26
may in time be effectively challenged and U.S. carriers
22
will become more vulnerable.
The Soviet merchant fleet now ranks fifth in the world
in tonnage and its rate of growth is impressive. The
Soviets were in twenty-first place in 1950, with only 432
major merchant vessels totaling only 1.8 million deadweight
tons (dwt). Today, they have over 1,442 ships with a total
of 12 million dwt, and by 1970 they plan to have 2,600 ships,
with a total of 14.8 million dwt. Comparatively, present
Soviet merchant ships are already more numerous than those
of the United States, though deadweight tonnage is slightly
less. Qualitatively, the Soviet vessels are almost totally
modern in design and vintage, which is just the reverse of
the U.S. situation.
The Soviets now carryover fifty percent of their own
international seaborne trade. By 1975 this figure is expected
to increase to 75 percent. In the coming years, such a
fleet, centrally managed and directly controlled by the gov-
ernment, will pose a major challenge to western trade and
shipping.
Another indicator of this broad range of ambitions is
the expansion of their activities. In 1950 they were con-
ducting maritime trade with only forty-two countries. Today
they trade with more than one hundred countries, most of
which are noncommunist. 23
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Expansion of the Soviet high-seas fishing fleet is one
cf' their program I s mos t drama tic achf.e vemen ts . 'I'oday , i:' is
the larges t fleet in tonnage in the \\}urld .. some eLe ve n r Lnie s
greater than that of the United states. Like its merchant
counterpart, the Soviet fishing fleet is also one of the
world's most modern. It includes large numbers of late-
model stern-trawlers, medium trawlers, factory ships, re-
frigerator transports and support vessels. These far-
ranging vessels regularly show a healthy profit. An added
dividend is the fleet's ability to incorporate or mask the
collection of intelligence information while working foreign
waters.
About 1,500 more vessels are scheduled to be added to
24
the Soviet fishing fleet during the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan.
The Soviets are now overtaking the United States in
some aspects of the fundamental and critical field of
oceanography. They have held the lead in polar oceanography
for many years, but are now assuming first rank in fishing
technology and several areas of geological exploration.
Known weaknesses in marine engineering and instrumentation,
basic marine-biology, data handling and laboratory facili-
ties are being systematically overcome. 25
The extension of Soviet maritime aid to developing
nations has reached sizable proportions and now embraces
Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, The Peoples' Republic
28
of Southern Yemen, LndLa and Endone s La , The Soviet Union
has concentrated on coun t r-Le s whose geogro.phical position
is of great strategic importance. Of the twenty-five
countries receiving Soviet military aid, fifteen have re-
ceived maritime assistance. Their inventory or assistance
includes about three hundred naval vessels of various types
including guided-missile patrol boats and submarines. Port
facility development and manpower training are also provided.
This program has tended to maximize Soviet influence in a
number of states, at the expense of the United states and
26
its allies.
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FIGURE 1
CLOSED SEAS AND HISTORIC WATERS
CHAPTER IV
SOVIET SEAS
Soviet seas will be discussed individually in two sec-
tions, closed seas and historic waters. The discussion of
necessity will be brief and will cover only geographic con-
siderations, a brief history and the present status of the
sea.
All seas will not be covered since some of them have
definite high seas character (Barents and Bering) while
others are obviously Soviet internal waters (Sea of Azov
1
and Aral Sea).
Section 1
Closed Seas
In the introduction it was indicated that the Soviet
Union had made informal claims to five closed seas: the
Black, Baltic, Caspian, Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk.
To emphasize the problem each of these will be explored
briefly. Figure 1 shows the Closed Seas marked in blue.
Black Sea. The Black Sea is bounded by the U.S.S.R.,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It covers an area of 168,500
square miles or an area slightly larger than California.
Entry from the Mediterranean is possible via the Bosporus
33
Strai t s , Sea of Marmara Lhr-ough the Dai-dane Ll.es . 'I'her-e ape
several large rivers and the Sea of Azov which provides for
greater navigational possibility in the area. The Danube,
Ukraine, Bug and Dnepr Rivers are the major ones with the
Danube being the largest and most navigable. The others are
not to be slighted in that they connect with many tributaries
and the U.S.S.R. inland waterway system. The upper water of
the Black Sea has a low salinity allowing some ice formation.
The lower water, below about 600 feet, is brackish since it
cannot flow out over the sill of the straits. Most of the
fish are found in the upper 600 feet. The Black Sea is very
deep to the south with a maximum depth of 7,500 feet while
2it is more shallow to the north.
The Black Sea is by far the best example of a closed
sea. The straits are controlled by Turkey and there has
been some regime of control ever since 1774. Since then
there has been at least six agreements concerning the con-
trol of the straits. The present regime is the Montreux
Convention of 1936.3 This was to remain in effect until
1956 and thereafter may be terminated by two year advance
notice by one of the parties. This regime provides for the
complete freedom of transit and navigation, subject only to
the payment of charges, and the regulation of sanitary
measures as prescribed by the Convention. Turkey retains,
however, the right to refuse passage to merchant ships
34
belonging to states with which they are presently at war.
There are various limits on warships in time of peace as
well as war. Passage for submarines is forbidden, except
that the Black Sea Powers are given the right to bring,
through the straits into the Black Sea, submarines con-
structed or purchased outside, and to send submarines out for
repair and bring them back. All passage is subject to prior
4permission of Turkey.
Proposals for revision of the Montreux Convention were
the subject of an exchange of notes between Russia, Turkey,
Great Britain and the United States in 1946. Up to the
present there is little prospect of agreement. Russian de-
mands may be summarized as follows: (1) the Straits must be
granted in special circumstances,' no -vessel of war belonging
to non-Black Sea powers shall be allowed to pass through the
Straits. (4) Authority to draw up a new regime of the Straits
shall be vested in Black Sea powers alone. (5) In order to
prevent the Straits from being used in a manner contrary to
the interests of the Black Sea powers, the Straits should
be defended by the joint action of Turkey and Russia. Turkey
has expressed a willingness to accept the first three of
these. 5
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Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sca L1 bounded by Sweden, Den-
mark .. Germany, Poland, U.S.S.1\., and Finland. It hac; a
natural entrance to the North Sea via the Kattegat and
Skagerrak. There are several straits which lead through
the Danish islands, the major of which is the Oresund (the
Sound). There are two major canals which are used for entry
and exit from the Baltic. The Kiel Canal cuts across the
northern part of Germany across the Danish Peninsula. This
canal is an international waterway. The White Sea-Baltic
canal connects the Gulf of Finland with the White Sea and is
subject to complete control of the U.S.S.R. This canal was
completed in 1933 by use of forced labor. 6 The Baltic covers
an area of 153,250 square miles or is about twice the size
of Kansas. The Baltic drains four times as much land area as
its own area and thus the salinity is very low. For this
reason there are few fish and the area freezes over in the
winter for as much as three months a year. Ice breakers can
keep the area open in the south except in extreme weather.7
The Baltic Straits are of unusual economic and strategic
importance. The Great Belt is the only section which is
truly navigable by larger vessels, and it has a width of
about 10 miles and depth from 21 to 180 feet. Denmark con-
trolled these straits in an unlimited fashion for a number
of years, but this Danish monopoly violated the economic
and political interests of the Baltic Powers. Russia claims
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to have concluded agr'e ement.o 111 1'(80 and 1800 for opening
the Baltic t.o me i-chu nt. v e e s e Ls , while c Los Lng iL to wai-s h Lps
without permission to enter. 8 The final regime was estab-
lished in 1857. It abolished the "Orsund Duties" (sound
dues) and opened the Baltic to passage of warships as well
as merchant. During the first and second world wars, the
straits were closed by Germany which directed Denmark to
control the entrance by land controlled minefields. It was
very effective. 9 In 1951 Denmark issued a Royal Edict which
was to regulate the passage of warships through the straits.
It restricts passage of warships without notice to the Great
Belt. No more than three warships are allowed in the strait
at one time and then for no longer than 48 hours. There is
a clause which states that NATO powers on NATO maneuvers
may use Danish territorial waters. It would appear that
the regulation of the straits is generally only restrictive.
to the U.S.S.R. and its allies. 10
The Kiel Canal was constructed in 1895 for strategic
purposes of Germany. It is about fifty miles long with
thirty-five foot draft capability. After World War I the
canal was open to all merchant and warships not at war With
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. In 1936 Germany re-
fused to honor this part of the treaty and after World War
II it fell in the British Zone of occupation. It presently
belongs to the Federal Republic of Germany. Navigation
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through the canal is open to all merchant vessels after
payment is made and to warships with appropriate permission
through diplomatic channels. l l
Caspian Sea. The Caspian Sea is a large inland body
of water which is bordered by the U.S.S.R. to the north and
Iran to the south. The sea covers an area of about 143,000
square miles or slightly smaller than Montana. This area
is eighty-five feet below sea level. The Caspian Sea drains
the Volga River, Terek River, Kura River, and the Ural
River. 12 Over one half of the waters that enter the Caspian
Sea are from the Volga River which is connected to the Sea
of Azov by the Volga-Don canal and with the White Sea and
13the Baltic by the Soviet inland water systems. The
northern reaches of this sea freezes over during the winter
for one to three months each year. This has been one of
the major Soviet fishing areas but has decreased in im-
portance due to the growth of the large ocean fishing
fleet, but not in quantity of fish.
The Caspian Sea is controlled by a treaty between the
Soviet Union and Iran. It is regarded as a Soviet and
Iranian Sea. The northern part of this sea is an integral
part of the U.S.S.R., while the southern part is a part of
Iran. This sea is closed to all vessels but thoooof the
littoral states. Soviet and Iranian fishing vessels have
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fi~hing rights throughout the length of the sea except for a
ten mile coastal zone which is reserved for the exclusive
use of the coastal state.14
The Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan is bounded by Japan
on the east, U.S.S.R. to the north, and North and South
Korea to the west. It covers an area of 389,100 square
miles or is about the size of Arizona, California, and
Colorado combined. The Korean and Tsushima Straits allow
entry from the south, Shimonoseki Straits link it to the
Japanese Inland Sea and to the north are the Tsugara, Soya
(La Perouse) and Tatar. The sea abounds with fish. The
entire sea is generally free of ice providing Vladivostok
as an ice free port year round. 15
There is no international regime for the control of this
sea or the straits that lead to it. The U.S.S.R. proposed
the establishment of a regime for the straits that would
guarantee the security of all powers bordering it at the
San Francisco Conference of September 1951. They proposed
demilitarization of straits, free passage of merchant vessels
and restriction of passage of warships to only littoral
states. This proposal was not adopted. 16
Sea of Okhotsk. The Sea of Okhotsk is a large gulf of
the Pacific Ocean which indents into the U.S.S.R. and is
bounded on the east by the Kamchatka Peninsula, and Kurile
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Islands and on the s cuth by Japan. 'This sea cov ei-s abcu:
590,000 square miles which is twice the size of Texas. The
Tatar and Soya (La Perouse) straits connect this sea with
the Sea of Japan. The sea abounds with fish, dolphin, seal,
and whale. It is generally frozen over from November to
April. The inflow of Pacific water causes dense fog in the
Kurile Island chain throughout most of the year. The Amur
River empties into this sea. 17
The Sea of Okhotsk has become more of a closed sea since
1945 when the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands
were turned over to them. They have continually declared
that this sea was closed to warships and overflight by air-
craft of nonlittoral states. 18 As recently as 1955 there
have been claims and enforcement of most of the area as a
"historic sea." l 9
Section 2
Historic waters
A brief review of the Soviet claims, both formal and
informal to sea areas as historic waters is of interest and
will cover the same general information that was covered for
closed seas. Areas which fall in the category of bays with
a baseline of 24 miles or less will not be discussed since
they have a very definite place in present international law.
Historic bays and waters which may not fall into that category
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will be covered. These do nut have such 3. rigid definition,
and as has been stated before, should be handled on a ~3.se by
case basis. 20 Figure 1 shows historic waters marked in red.
Gulf of Riga. The Gulf of Riga is considered as a his-
toric bay by the Soviet Union. 21 It covers 7,350 square
miles, about the size of New Jersey, and is bounded by the
Soviet Union on all sides, and opens into the Baltic via the
Gulf of Finland. 22 The mouth of the bay is 28 miles wide. 23
The Soviet claim to the Gulf of Riga is based on the Treaty
of Nystad of 1721 to which the Soviets state no nation has
24protested.
White Sea. The White Sea opens into the Barents Sea
and is bounded by the Kola Peninsula and Kanin Peninsula of
the U.S.S.R. It covers an area of 32,281 square miles or is
about the size of Indiana. It has an average depth of 325
feet. This sea freezes over from November to May, but the
port of Arkhangelsk is generally kept open by use of ice
breakers. By use of the White Sea-Baltic Canal and inland
water system, this sea is connected to the Baltic, Caspian
and Black Seas. Fishing for herring and cod are prominent
in the summer. 25
The White Sea was declared a historic bay in a note
from the Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the
RSFSR to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway on 4 May
1920. 26 41
Cheshskaya Bay. Cheshskaya Bay has an opening about
thirty miles in width and covers an area about 6,000 square
miles or is about the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island
combined. It opens into the Barents Sea. It is mentioned
only in passing as a historic bay in the Soviet law manual. 27
This claim has been in force since about 1921. 28
Peter the Great Bay. Peter the Great Bay is a slight
indention into the Soviet coast in the northern part of the
Sea of Japan. It is entirely bounded by the U.S.S.R. The
major port of the area is Vladivostok. It is the major ice
free port of the Soviet Union. The size of the bay depends
on what line is accepted as the boundary, but it covers ap-
proximately 1,800 miles as claimed by the U.S.S.R. This is
about the same size as Delaware.
Peter the Great Bay was declared a historic bay up to
a line connecting the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River and with
Cape Povorotnyy on 20 July 1957. 29 The baseline for this is
108 miles long. This was reportedly reflected in the Rules
Governing Fishing in the Territorial Waters of the Amur
Governor-General issued in 1901. 30 The United States pro-
tested the closure of the bay and the Soviet Union countered
that it was a historic bay, but argued further that it was
a "vital bay~1131 They compared it to the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case of 1951. 32 This water area is not truly a bay
as defined in the Geneva Convention. There is not a long
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history of control by the Soviet Union since the Japanese
fished there until 19j9. 'I'ho i-o L~ no :1Cql1:LC~~cc~J)cC' :3]11C,'
, )
seven nn t Lon.i pr-ot.c s t.o d Lho c Lo sur c , -'-'
Arctic Seas. The Kara ~3ea is part of the Arctic Ocean
north of the U.S.S.R. between Novaya Zemlya and Svernaya
Zemlya. It covers an area of 340,000 square miles. The Ob,
Yenisei and Pyasina Rivers empty into this sea. The water
is frozen over about nine months of the year. The major port
is Dikson at the mouth of the Yenisei River. 34
The Laptev Sea is part of the Arctic Ocean to the north
of the U.S.S.R. between Svernaya Zemlya and the New Siberian
Islands. It covers an area of 250,000 square miles. It re-
ceives the waters of the Lena, Khatanga and Yana Rivers.
The major port is Tiksiat at the mouth of the Lena River.
The sea is frozen over eight to nine months of the year. 35
The Chukotsk Sea (sometimes CHUKCHI) is part of the
Arctic Ocean north of the Bering Straits and east of Wrangel
Island to Alaska. It is covered 'with ice eight months of
the year. 36
The East Siberian Sea is part of the Arctic Ocean north
of the U.S.S.R., bordered on the 'west by the New Siberian
Islands and on the east by Wrangel Ioland. The Kolyma and
Indigirka Rivers are the major ones that drain to this sea,
and they have only limited navigational potential. This sea
covers an area
depth of about
of 337,750 square miles and has an average
100 feet 37
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Siberian Sea are considered by many jurists to be akin to
gulfs and therefore, subject to the rules of internal waters.
The Anglo-Norwegian case of 1951 provides a great deal of
fuel for this argument. 38
other jurists conclude that these waters are obviously
80viet due to: (1) Navigation depends on the adjacent state.
(2) Sovereignty by the Soviet Union is necessary for na-
tional security. (3) Russian ships are the only ones that
navigate these waters. (4) It is not an international sea
route. (5) Russia has always exercised its authority over
the area. 39 Russian decrees of 1616 and 1620 and Acts of
1839 and 1869 regulated navigation in this area and thus
these seas llmust be considered as our national waters, as
closed seas, 'whose legal regime must be determined in virtue
of the recognition of sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. over
these seas. ,,40
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CHAPTER·Y
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions. The Soviet Union has enclosed itself in
a cocoon of territorial water which is 12 miles in width.
This limit starts at the outer edge of the internal waters.
The United States has expressed concern over the 12 mile
limit but since most of the claims to historic waters are
of unofficial nature they have not attempted to establish
where the majority of these inland waters end.
The seas that have been listed as closed seas as well
as those that have been listed as historic waters were at
one time or another classified as a closed sea. This classi-
fication has changed over the years until they are now
classed as indicated in Chapter IY. Even now the Sea of
Okhotsk is on the brink of changing from a closed sea to an
historic water. l This will be the first sea to be uni-
laterially declared by the Soviets as such while it still
borders another state. Should communism extend into South
Korea similar claims might be made to the Sea of Japan. The
north part of the Caspian is of course already internal
waters of the Soviet Union. Communism has spread to all of
the Black Sea powers except Turkey. The present regime of
the Black Sea has not given the Soviet Union a strong posi-
tion of control but the next change is sure to strengthen
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this control and further military control of the Eastern
Mediterranean would be more assured. The Soviet Union has
been very patient in this area as if they expected communism
I
to consume Turkey sooner or later.
The Soviet growing military strength in the Baltic is
bound to deter other military forces in this area primarily
due to Soviet control of the air over the sea.
Apparently the regime of closed seas 1s passing into
history. The only real regime which allowed for control of
these seas was the regime of the straits that allowed entry
and exit. Disagreement on control of these straits will most
likely continue as debates in the international arena. When
the Soviet Union has her naval forces at the desired level
they can be assured that no sane naval commander would at-
tempt to operate his forces where logistic support could be
sliced on a moment's notice and control of the air, surface
and subsurface would be immediately denied. Why should the
Soviet Union push closed seas any further when they are in
fact closed and once communism overtakes the littoral states
they can become historic waters.
But what of the historic waters, especially those vast
frozen areas to the north. These historic waters carry the
possible claim of internal waters. As such there is no in-
nocent passage and jurisdiction over those who venture
through is complete. This appears to be a much better
regime for the Soviets than one for closed seas.
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The Northwind incident of 1965 and the Eastwind and
Edisto incident of 1967 have shown the absolute control
~Ihlch the ~oviet Union exercises. 2 Even if these vessels
had been merchant vessels they would have been required to
use Soviet icebreakers. 3
It is not clear why the United States has not chal-
lenged the Soviet control over this area by more frequent
diplomatic protest and by continued effort to use these
waters for commercial and military purposes. The only
apparent reason is that they have accepted Soviet control
and sovereignty over these seas.
Recommendations. It is recommended that closed seas
as defined here be considered as high seas subject only to
the regime that controls the straits or canals that allow
entry and exit.
It is further recommended that the following regime
be established on a case by case basis and that it be in-
corporated into the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zonej
Historic waters are those waters which due to the
geographic, economic and security characteristics
may be considered as territorial waters of the
littoral state. SUch areas may be bordered by one
or more states subject to agreement between the
littoral states and the approval of a special com-
mission which will be established in a like manner
to Articles 9-12 of the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, or the optional protocols adopted at the 1958
Geneva Conference. 4 The burden of proof of such
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claims is on the state making the claim. The
following factors must be considered to deter-
mine the hir, Lurie nt.a t uu oI' t.hc area; 1) i.hc
au Lhor-L ty e xer-c Ls e d OVl)J' thc ur-ea by t.ho :;1.u.le
claiming it as "historic"; ~~) the continuity 01'
such exercise of authority; 3) the attitude of
foreign States.5 All areas which have not been
resolved in the past by some multilateral means
or which have not been resolved as indicated above
will be considered as high seas.
The right of the littoral state to claim "historic"
waters as territorial waters vice internal waters is suf-
ficient to provide adequate jurisdiction while still pro-
viding for innocent passage through the area. The three
guidelines which are given to be considered will meet with
opposition from the Soviet Union especially concerning the
"attitude of foreign States," but the commission or the
court should be able to determine if an attitude of a
foreign State is new or, in fact, is the historic attitude
that has existed.
This method of resolving problems of historic waters
might also be expanded to include settlement of claims to
straits, archipelagoes or polar sectors.
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CHA rrrEE V
1
Harben~ p. 153.
2Butler~ p. 84; !rEdisto & Eastwind Planned 8000 Mile
Voyage, 11 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, 18 September 1967,
p. 521.
3Butler, p. 138.
4Secretariat, p. 74.
5Ibid., p. 72.
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